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The	operation	of	mitigation	under	Japanese	and	English	commercial	law:	a	
comparative	analysis.	
Anthony	Rogers,	City	Law	School,	City,	University	of	London	
Makoto	Shimada,	Keio	University	Law	School	
	
Abstract	
	
A	commercial	contract	is	intended	to	lead	to	the	mutual	satisfaction	of	both	parties	
to	that	contract.	If	there	is	dissatisfaction	and	such	dissatisfaction	is	caused	by	a	
breach	of	the	contract	then,	except	in	rare	cases,	the	dissatisfied	will	seek	a	remedy	
either	a	commercially	agreed	one	or	a	formal	remedy	in	damages,	as	a	monetary	
expression	of	loss,	but	the	extent	of	damages	has	the	potential	to	cause	dispute;	
how	much	money	is	it	appropriate	for	the	court	to	award?	
In	considering	this	we	should	bear	in	mind	that,	it	is	often	the	case	that	the	breach	
will	arise	because	the	party,	although	having	the	capability	to	fulfil	its	obligation,	
notes	that	at	the	time	of	discharge	there	are	changed	economic	circumstances,	
which	offer	more	lucrative	returns,	and	it	has	been	tempted	into	breach	in	order	to	
obtain	greater	economic	benefit.	There	is	a	very	important	debate	amongst	
academics	and	jurists	as	to	the	way	that	such	default	should	be	viewed.		
When	considering	the	benefit	and	utility	of	breach	in	preference	to	performance,	the	
“breaching”	party	needs	to	know	the	extent	of	likely	damages;	likewise,	the	“non-
breaching”	party	needs	to	know	its	entitlement	to	redress.	Quantifying	the	amount	
of	damages	has	concentrated	minds	through	the	ages	and	in	all	countries	and	the	
task	is	not	an	easy	one.	
We	propose	to	consider	the	issues	related	to	limiting	damages	from	the	perspective	
of	two	of	the	legal	regimes	found	in	two	commercially	sophisticated	countries:	Japan	
and	England	and	Wales.	
	
I. INTRODUCTION	
A	commercial	contract	is	intended	to	lead	to	the	mutual	satisfaction	of	both	
parties	to	that	contract.	If	there	is	dissatisfaction	and	such	dissatisfaction	is	
caused	by	a	breach	of	the	contract	then,	except	in	rare	cases,	the	dissatisfied	will	
	 2	
seek	a	remedy	either	a	commercially	agreed	one	or	a	formal	remedy	in	damages.		
This	is	unremarkable.	
The	subject	becomes	more	interesting	when	we	start	to	examine	it	in	greater	
detail;	damages,	as	a	monetary	expression	of	loss,	have	the	ability	to	satisfy,	but	
the	extent	of	those	damages	has	the	potential	to	cause	dispute;	how	much	money	
is	it	appropriate	for	the	court	to	award?	
In	considering	this	we	should	bear	in	mind	that	it	may	be	the	case	that	the	
breach	comes	about	because	a	willing	party	is	unable	to	discharge	its	duty	for	
financial	or	practical	reasons.	However,	it	is	often	the	case	that	the	breach	will	
arise	because	the	party,	although	having	the	capability	to	fulfil	its	obligation,	
notes	that	at	the	time	of	discharge	there	are	changed	economic	circumstances,	
which	offer	more	lucrative	returns,	and	it	has	been	tempted	into	breach	in	order	
to	obtain	greater	economic	benefit.	There	is	a	very	important	debate	amongst	
academics	and	jurists	as	to	the	way	that	such	default	should	be	viewed.	
We	do	not	wish	to	explore	the	question	of	moral	obligation	in	this	article	and	so	
will	confine	our	discussion	to	purely	economic	motivation	and	consequences.	
Therefore,	when	considering	the	benefit	and	utility	of	breach	in	preference	to	
performance,	the	“breaching”	party	needs	to	know	the	extent	of	likely	damages;	
likewise,	the	“non-breaching”	party	needs	to	know	its	entitlement	to	redress.	
Quantifying	the	amount	of	damages	has	concentrated	minds	through	the	ages	
and	in	all	countries	and	the	task	is	not	an	easy	one.	
We	propose	to	consider	the	issues	from	the	perspective	of	two	of	the	legal	
regimes	found	in	two	commercially	sophisticated	countries:	Japan	and	England	
and	Wales,	(the	UK	of	course	has	more	than	one	legal	regime,	with	Scotland	
being	the	prime	example).	
	
II. REMOTENESS	AND	ASSESSMENT	OF	DAMAGES	
1. Remoteness	
A	superficial	consideration	might	start	by	asking	what	it	is	that	the	non-
breaching	party	has	lost.			How	closely	connected	is	the	loss	with	the	breaching	
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event?	In	England,	this	is	expressed	as	the	concept	of,	“remoteness”.	This	
approach	is	found	in	leading	English	cases	and	can	also	be	identified	in	the	law	of	
other	countries	including	Japan.		
In	Japan,	Article	416	of	the	Civil	Code	provides	that	(1)	the	purpose	of	the	
demand	for	the	damages	for	failure	to	perform	an	obligation	shall	be	to	demand	
the	compensation	for	damages	which	would	ordinarily	arise	from	such	failure;	
and	(2)	the	obligee	may	also	demand	the	compensation	for	damages	which	arise	
from	any	special	circumstances	if	the	party	did	foresee,	or	should	have	foreseen,	
such	circumstances.	1	The	rule	was	adopted	when	the	code	was	enacted	(1896)	
under	the	influence	of	the	leading	English	case	at	that	time,that	is	Hadley	v.	
Baxendale.2		
In	England	the	case	of,	Hadley	v.	Baxendale3	remains	a	leading	case	and	together	
with		that	of	Victoria	Laundry	(Windsor)	Ltd	v.	Newman	Industries	Ltd4	are	very	
influential	cases	in	this	area.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	in	this	regard	and	also	
in	several	others,	that	it	is	possible	to	trace	a	direct	connection	between	the	legal	
systems	of	Japan	and	England.	
In	Hadley	v.	Baxendale,	the	case	had	an	industrial	setting:	Hadley	had	a	flourmill	
in	Gloucester,	England	known	as	the	City	Steam-	Mills.	The	crankshaft	on	the	mill	
broke	and	needed	replacement,	without	it	the	mill	could	not	work.	W.	Joyce	&	Co	
at	Greenwich,	London	agreed	to	make	another	but	required	the	original	to	use	as	
a	template.	The	defendant	was	a	common	carrier	trading	under	the	name	
Pickford	&	Co	and	was	contracted	to	carry	the	crankshaft	to	Greenwich	and	back	
to	Gloucester.	The	defendant	delayed	the	return	of	the	crankshaft	and	
consequently	the	plaintiff	was	unable	to	operate	the	machine	and	so	earn	a	living	
from	it	for	five	days	more	than	would	have	been	the	case	had	the	transport	been	
accomplished	as	agreed.	The	plaintiff	claimed	loss	and	damages	in	respect	of	this	
period	of	time.	Alderson	B	held	for	the	plaintiff	and	in	so	doing	noted	that	a	
																																																								
1	Civil	Code	of	Japan	(Act	No.	89	of	1896).	
2	Yoichi	Sakaguchi,	Hadley	v.	Baxendale	(1854)	and	Article	416	of	the	Japanese	Civil	Code	in	
Tokyo	University	of	Foreign	Studies	(ed),	Are	and	Cultural	Study	Issue	24	(Tokyo	University	of	
Foreign	Studies	1974),	245-250.	
3	Hadley	v.	Baxendale	(1854)	9	Exch	341.	
4	Victoria	Laundry	(Windsor)	Ltd	V.	Newman	Industries	Ltd	[1949]	2	KB	528.	
	 4	
similar	practice	could	be	found	in	America	and	also	in	France	under	that	
country’s	code.	He	also	referred	favourably	to	an	earlier	decision	of	Parke	J,	(as	
he	then	was)	in	Brandt	v.	Bowlby5,	a	case	about	non-	delivery	of	wheat	carried	by	
sea.	Where	Parke	J	said:	
“…the	plaintiffs	are	entitled	to	be	put	in	the	same	situation	as	they	would	have	
been	in,	if	the	cargo	had	been	delivered	to	their	order	at	the	time	when	it	was	
delivered	to	the	wrong	party;	and	the	sum	it	would	have	fetched	at	that	time	is	
the	amount	of	the	loss	sustained	by	the	non-performance	of	the	defendants'	
contract.”		
This	deals	with	damages	but	is	only	a	starting	point;	it	makes	an	assumption	that	
damages	must	be	directly	connected	to	a	financial	loss.	This	assumption	is	
sometimes	described	as	the	claimant’s	“expectation	interest”.6		
	
2. Is	non-financial	loss	excluded?	
In	England	there	are	circumstances	however,	where	an	insistence	that	financial	
loss	is	the	sole	basis	of	the	claim	might	lead	to	no	remedy	in	damages	because	
there	is	no	financial	loss;	as	in	the	leading	case	of	Ruxley	Electronics	and	
Construction	Ltd	v.	Forsyth7	but	here	Lord	Mustill	said	that	the	measure	of	
damages	was:	
																																																								
5	Brandt	v.	Bowlby	2	B	&	Ald	932.	
6	H	G	Beale	and	others	(eds),	Chitty	on	Contracts	(33rd	ed,	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2018)	Vol	1,	26-022.	
This	is	an	issue	for	those	with	an	interest	in	contract	law	theory	and	one	that	has	excited	much	
academic	activity	in	the	common	law	world.		What	should	be	the	basis	upon	which	the	dispute	is	
to	be	resolved?	Expectation	damages	seek	to	put	the	injured	party	in	the	position	it	would	have	
been	if	the	contract	had	been	performed	while	Reliance	damages	seek	to	put	that	part	in	the	
position	it	would	have	been	if	the	contract	had	not	been	made.		The	former	may	be	characterised	
as	being	a	“traditional	“position	while	the	later	find	more	favour,	(though	not	completely	so)	with	
the	ideas	of	the	“Wisconsin		School	“	in	the	US	led	by		Stewart	Macauley	and	Ian	Macneil	and	By	
David	Campbell	in	the	UK.	Key	articles	include:	
Fuller	L.L	and	Purdue	W.R.	Jnr,	The	reliance	interest	in	contract	damages	In	two	parts.	(1936)	46	
Yale	LJ	52	and	373.For	alternative	view	see:	Macauley	S,	The	reliance	interest	and	the	world	
outside	the	Law	School’s	doors	[1991]	Wis	L	Rev	247;	D,	The	Relational	Constitution	of	Remedy:	
Co-operation	as	the	implicit	Second	principle	of	Remedies	for	Breach	of	Contract.	11	Tex	
Wesleyan	L.	Rev	455	(2005)	
7	Ruxley	Electronics	and	Construction	Ltd	v.	Forsyth	[1996]	AC	344.	
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“…the	loss	truly	suffered	by	the	promisee”	and	that	although	there	was	no	
monetary	loss	he	awarded	“loss	of	amenity”	damages.	
	In	Japan,	to	the	contrary,	the	measure	of	damages	is	not	limited	to	financial	
loss.8	However,	in	most	cases	where	damages	for	both	financial	and	non-
financial	losses	are	claimed,	the	courts	do	not	award	non-financial	loss	damages,	
deciding	that	such	loss	shall	be	recovered	by	compensation	of	financial	loss.9	
Non-financial	loss	may	be	found	only	in	the	case	where	the	claimant’s	life,	body,	
liberty,	honour	or	other	personal	interests	is	injured	as	a	result	of	the	
defendant’s	breach	of	contract.10	Even	in	such	cases,	the	amount	of	damages,	
decided	by	the	court	in	its	discretion,	is	relatively	small.	Accordingly,	decisions	of	
Japanese	courts	in	respect	of	non-financial	loss	would	not	be	so	different	from	
those	of	UK	court.	
		
3. When	should	damages	be	assessed?	
In	England,	another	relevant	question,	which	must	be	answered,	is	when	should	
damages	be	assessed	and	when	should	the	non-	breaching	party	get	a	substitute	
and	so	be	able	to	calculate	loss.	Surely	this	is	at	the	time	of	breach?	
In	Johnson	v.	Agnew.11		Lord	Wilberforce	considers	the	point	and	says	that	this	is	
not	necessarily	so:	
“The	general	principle	for	the	assessment	of	damages	is	compensatory,	i.e.	that	
the	innocent	party	is	to	be	placed,	so	far	as	money	can	do	so,	in	the	same	position	
as	if	the	contract	had	been	performed.	Where	the	contract	is	one	of	sale,	this	
principle	normally	leads	to	assessment	of	damages	as	at	the	date	of	the	breach	-	
a	principle	recognised	and	embodied	in	section	51	of	the	Sale	of	Goods	Act	1893.	
But	this	is	not	an	absolute	rule:	if	to	follow	it	would	give	rise	to	injustice,	the	
court	has	power	to	fix	such	other	date	as	may	be	appropriate	in	the	
circumstances.”	
																																																								
8Judgment	of	Great	Court	of	Cassation	Grand	Court	of	26	January	1915	Minroku	21-49.	
9	Judgment	of	Fukuoka	High	Court	of	31	January	2006	Hanta	1235-217.	
10	Judgment	of	Tokyo	District	Court	of	31	March	2004	LLI/DB.	
11	Johnson	v.	Agnew	[1980]	AC	367.	
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	A	later	English	court	says	that	because	all	factors	must	be	taken	into	account,	
including	those	that	arise	during	the	time	between	breach	and	trial;	this	will	
include	the	effect	of	the	operation	of	agreed	terms	of	the	contract.	This	approach	
caused	some	controversy	following	the	decision	in	Golden	Strait	Corp	v.	Nippon	
Yusen	Kubishika	Kaisha,	The	Golden	Victory	12	but	this	has	to	some	extent	been	
subdued	by	the	case’s	affirmation	in	Bunge	SA	v.	Nidera	BV13	and	now	seems	to	
be	more	generally	accepted	as	correct.	
In	the	first	of	these	two	cases	the	subject	of	the	dispute	was	the	breach	of	a	time	
charter	for	a	sailing	vessel.	The	shipowner	claimed	the	hire	unpaid	for	the	
remaining	duration	of	the	charter.	The	second	case	concerned	the	non	-delivery	
of	wheat	from	Russia	under	a	sale	contract.	Each	contract	contained	a	clause	
allowing	for	its	termination	before	the	end	of	its	term	in	certain	specified	
circumstance.	These	events	did	occur	but	took	place	after	breach	and	before	
trial;	should	they	be	taken	into	account	at	the	trial?	Yes,	was	the	answer	in	both	
cases.	
In	Japan,	rules	concerning	time	for	assessment	are	not	clear	and	there	are	no	
cases	similar	to	The	Golden	Victory	or	Bunge	SA	v.	Nidera	BV.	However,	in	
consideration	of	the	following	cases,	Japanese	courts	would	possibly	hold	the	
same	decisions	as	those	in	England	under	the	same	circumstances.	
Likewise	in	England,	Japanese	courts	take	into	account	various	factors	in	
deciding	the	point	of	assessment	of	damages.	In	one	leading	case	about	a	sale	of	
real	property,	where	the	seller	failed	to	deliver	such	property	to	the	purchaser	
but	disposed	of	it	to	a	third	party,	the	Supreme	Court	indicated	the	following	
rules	for	assessment	of	damages:14	
1) In	principle,	damages	should	be	calculated	on	the	basis	of	the	market	
value	of	the	object	of	sale	at	the	time	when	the	defendant’s	duty	to	deliver	
it	becomes	impossible.	
																																																								
12	Golden	Strait	Corp	v.	Nippon	Yusen	Kubishika	Kaisha	[2007]	UKHL	12.	
13	Bunge	SA	v.	Nidera	BV	[2015]	UKSC	43.	
14	Judgment	of	Supreme	Court	of	16	November	1962	Minshu	16-11-2280.	
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2) However,	if	the	market	price	of	the	object	is	increasing	and	the	seller	
should	have	foreseen	such	increase,	the	amount	of	damages	should	be	the	
market	price	at	the	time	of	conclusion	of	the	hearing.	
3) Notwithstanding	(ii)	above,	the	claimant	should	not	be	awarded	the	
market	value	of	the	object	at	present	if	he	or	she	could	have	disposed	of	it	
before	its	market	value	reached	such	level.	Further,	if	the	price	is	
decreasing	after	it	reached	the	highest	level,	the	claimant	should	not	be	
awarded	damages	on	the	basis	of	the	highest	value	unless	the	claimant	
proves	that	the	object	should	have	been	disposed	of	at	that	point.	
There	are	also	cases	where	the	court	assessed	the	amount	of	damages	at	the	time	
(i)	when	the	contract	was	terminated	on	the	basis	of	breach,15	(ii)	when	the	
obligation	in	breach	was	due,16	(iii)	when	the	claim	for	damages	was	made,17	(iv)	
when	the	lawsuit	was	commenced,18	or	(iv)	when	the	hearing	was	concluded.19		
It	is	difficult	to	establish	general	rules	from	the	above	cases.	It	seems	that	
Japanese	courts	chose	a	time	for	assessment	in	the	flexible	manner	so	as	to	grant	
fair	and	reasonable	compensation	to	the	non-breaching	party,	taking	account	of	
contents	of	the	claim	and	relevant	incidents	that	occurred	up	until	the	conclusion	
of	the	hearing.		
	
III. MITIGATION	IN	ENGLAND	AND	WALES	
1. General	Rule	
It	is	clear	that	there	are	many	unresolved	questions	on	the	calculation	of	
damages	but	in	this	article,	we	wish	to	focus	on	another	aspect	and	one	that	has	
the	potential	to	affect	expectation	interest;	mitigation.	We	are	prompted	to	
examine	this	because	of	a	recent	and	controversial	case	that	came	up	before	the	
																																																								
15	Judgment	of	Supreme	Court	of	18	December	1953	Minshu	7-12-1446.	
16	Judgment	of	Supreme	Court	of	28	April	1961	Minshu	15-4-1105.	
17	Judgment	of	Supreme	Court	of	7	July	1961	Minshu	15-7-1800.	
18	Judgment	of	Great	Court	of	Cassation	of	18	March	1908	Minroku	14-290,	Judgment	of	Great	
Court	of	Cassation	of	2	October	1915	Minroku	21-1560.	
19	Judgment	of	Supreme	Court	of	21	January	1955	Minshu	9-1-22.	
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UK	Supreme	Court,	that	of	Fulton	Shipping	Inc	of	Panama	v.	Globalia	Business	
Travel	SAU	of	Spain.	The	New	Flamenco20	
Now	in	its	twentieth	edition	the	leading	textbook	in	English	law	on	the	subject,	
McGregor	on	Damages21	says	that	there	are	various	meanings	of	mitigation	but	
that	there	is	one	principal	meaning,	which	in	turn	can	be	reduced	to	three	
“rules”.	In	short	these	are:	
1) The	claimant	must	take	all	reasonable	steps	to	mitigate	their/its	loss	
consequent	upon	the	defendant’s	wrong	and	cannot	recover	damages	for	
any	loss	which,	through	unreasonable	action	or	inaction,	has	not	been	
avoided.	This	means	that	the	claimant	cannot	recover	for	reasonably	
avoided	loss.	
2) The	claimant	can	recover	for	loss	incurred	in	reasonable	attempts	to	
avoid	loss.	
3) Where	the	claimant	does	take	reasonably	necessary	steps	to	mitigate	the	
loss	the	breaching	party	is	entitled	to	the	benefit	arising	from	the	
claimant’s	action	and	is	liable	only	for	the	loss	as	lessened.	
Mitigation	is	an	expression	with	common	currency	in	the	world	of	commerce	
and	commercial	law	but	it	is	open	to	differences	of	interpretation	to	the	extent	
that	some	would	accept	it	as	a	concept	but	would	like	to	see	its	effect	reduced	22	
In	order	to	examine	mitigation	in	more	detail	we	should	consider	the	language	
we	use;	it	is	commonly	said	that	there	is	a	“duty”	to	mitigate.	This	is	not	so:	
in	Darbishire	v.	Warran,	Pearson	LJ23	makes	that	clear	when	he	says:	
“…it	is	important	to	appreciate	the	true	nature	of	the	so-called	“duty	to	
mitigate	the	loss”	or	“duty	to	minimise	the	damage.”	The	plaintiff	is	not	
under	any	actual	obligation	to	adopt	the	cheaper	method:	if	he	wishes	to	
																																																								
20	Fulton	Shipping	Inc	of	Panama	v.	Globalia	Business	Travel	SAU	of	Spain.	The	New	Flamenco	
[2017]	UKSC	43.	
21	J.	Edelman,	S	Colton	and	J	Varuhas,	McGregor	on	Damages	(20th	ed,	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2017).	
22	From	British	Westinghouse	to	The	New	Flamenco:	misunderstanding	mitigation.	The	Journal	of	
International	Maritime	Law	22	(2016)	5,	370-378	by	Professor	Victor	Goldberg.		
23	Darbishire	v.	Warran[1963]	1	W.L.R.	1067	at	p.	1075.		
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adopt	the	more	expensive	method,	he	is	at	liberty	to	do	so	and	by	doing	so	
he	commits	no	wrong	against	the	defendant	or	anyone	else.	The	true	
meaning	is	that	the	plaintiff	is	not	entitled	to	charge	the	defendant	by	way	
of	damages	with	any	greater	sum	than	that	which	he	reasonably	needs	to	
expend	for	the	purpose	of	making	good	the	loss.	In	short,	he	is	fully	
entitled	to	be	as	extravagant	as	he	pleases	but	not	at	the	expense	of	the	
defendant.”	
Other	common	law	jurisdictions	take	the	same	view.24	McGregor	says:	
“Even	persons	against	whom	wrongs	have	been	committed	are	not	entitled	
to	sit	back	and	suffer	loss	which	could	be	avoided	by	reasonable	efforts	or	to	
continue	an	activity	unreasonably	so	as	to	increase	the	loss.”25		
This	statement	found	judicial	articulation	by	Viscount	Haldane	LC	in:	
British	Westinghouse	Electric	and	Manufacturing	Co	v.	Underground	Railway	Co	of	
London	Ltd26	[1912]	AC	673.	
Where	he	says:	
“The	fundamental	basis	is	thus	compensation	for	pecuniary	loss	naturally	
flowing	from	the	breach;	but	this	first	principle	is	qualified	by	a	second,	
which	imposes	on	a	claimant	the	duty	of	taking	all	reasonable	steps	to	
mitigate	the	loss	consequent	on	the	breach	and	debars	him	from	claiming	
any	part	of	the	damage	which	is	due	to	his	neglect	to	take	such	steps.”	
British	Westinghouse	may	be	a	leading	case	but	it	has	not	put	an	end	to	the	
matter;	issues	still	arise.	
	
2. The	New	Flamenco		
																																																								
24	Southcott	Estates	Inc.	v.	Toronto	Catholic	District	School	Board,	2012	SCC	51,	[2012]	2	S.C.R.	
675.	
25	McGregor	(n	21)	9-014.	
26	British	Westinghouse	Electric	and	Manufacturing	Co	v.		Underground	Railway	Co	of	London	Ltd	
[1912]	AC	673.	
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A	case	on	this	point	is	that	of	The	New	Flamenco.27	This	concerned	the	New	
Flamenco,	a	small	cruise	ship.	The	vessel	was	timechartered	i.e.	the	subject	of	a	
contract	giving	the	chartering	party	the	right	to	exclusive	use	of	the	vessel,	
subject	to	certain	exceptions	set	out	in	the	charter,	for	a	fixed	period	of	time	and	
with	an	obligation,	again,	subject	to	some	exceptions,	to	make	continuous	
payment,	(known	as	“hire”).	The	period	of	the	charter	was	from	13th	February	
2004	to	2nd	November	2009.	In	the	event	the	charterer	redelivered	the	vessel	to	
the	owner	on	28th	October	2007	saying	that	it	was	unable	or	at	any	event	
unwilling	to	pay	further	hire.	
The	owner	treated	this	act	as	being	an	anticipatory	repudiatory	breach	(i.e.,	the	
charterer’s	renunciation	before	the	time	fixed	for	payment).		A	London	arbitrator	
initially	heard	the	case.	He	found	that	as	a	matter	of	fact	there	was	no	substitute	
two-	year	time	charter	available	in	the	market	at	that	time.		Thus,	implying	that	
damages	should	be	on	the	basis	of	the	total	payment	of	the	unpaid	hire	for	the	
remainder	of	the	full	charter	period.		
In	October	2007,	the	owner	sold	the	vessel	for	US$	23,765,000.	The	timing	of	this	
sale	is	important	because	it	took	place	before	the	occurrence	of	the	global	
financial	crisis,	following	which	there	was	a	serious	drop	in	international	trade,	
sea	carriage,	(both	for	cargo	and	for	passengers),	and	decimation	of	ship	values.		
It	was	agreed,	by	the	parties	to	the	dispute,	that	because	of	this	collapse	in	ship	
prices	the	vessel	would	have	achieved	only	US$	7,000,000	had	the	charter	
continued	its	anticipated	duration	and	been	returned	to	owners	in	November	
2009.		
The	owners	claimed	damages	of	US$	7,558,375,	a	sum	representing	the	net	loss	
of	profits	for	the	period	from	breach	to	the	end	of	the	charter.		
The	charterer	refused	to	pay	this	and	justified	its	position	by	arguing	that	the	
owner	was	obliged	to	mitigate	and	in	so	doing	to	give	credit	for	the	difference	
between	the	actual	sale	price	achieved	and	the	likely	value	in	November	2009.	In	
																																																								
27	The	New	Flamenco	[2014]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep	230.	It	later	went	on	appeal	to	both	the	Court	of	
Appeal	at	[2016]	Lloyd’s	Rep	1	383	and	the	Supreme	Court	at	[2017]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep	177.	
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other	words,	US$	23,765,000	minus	US$	7,000,000;	which	would	equal	
US$16,765,000;	enough	to	discharge	the	sum	being	claimed.	The	owner	argued	
that	this	should	not	be	taken	into	account.		
It	was	an	unusual	argument	that	was	employed	by	the	charterer	i.e.	that	the	sales	
proceeds	of	the	subject	matter	of	the	charter,	the	vessel,	should	be	applied	for	
the	benefit	of	a	party	who	had	failed	to	pay	for	the	use	of	the	vessel.	Unusual	
since	there	was	no	obligation	for	the	owner	to	sell	the	vessel.	What	of	the	
situation	where	the	owner	simply	kept	the	vessel	in	port,	was	this	a	failure	in	
mitigation?	Additionally,	the	owner	did	not	have	to	retain	ownership	of	the	
vessel	until	the	end	of	the	charter;	it	could	have	sold	it	on	to	a	new	buyer	who	
would	have	had	to	honour	the	existing	charterparty.	
London	arbitration	is	normally	a	closed	and	final	procedure.	However,	The	
Arbitration	Act	1996	allows	for	appeal	in	some	circumstances	to	the	High	Court28	
and	this	was	the	case	here	with	the	matter	being	considered	further	on	appeal	by	
the	Court	of	Appeal	and	ultimately	by	the	Supreme	Court.	
Popplewell	J	[in	the	High	Court]	analysed	the	concept	of	mitigation	in	some	detail	
and	considered	what	a	non-breaching	party	should	do.		In	summary,	he	said	that	
there	was	no	general	rule	but	he	concluded	that	there	were	eleven	principles	to	
be	taken	into	account:	
1)	The	benefit	claimed	must	be	caused	by	the	breach.	
2)	The	“causation	test”,	which	is	referred	to	in	several	of	the	leading	cases,	
requires	that	all	circumstances	be	taken	into	account	including	the	nature	and	
effect	of	the	breach	and	the	nature	of	the	benefit	and	of	the	loss.	
3)	Did	the	breach	cause	the	benefit?	It	is	not	enough	that	the	breach	gave	the	
opportunity	to	trigger	the	benefit.	
4)	The	name	is	not	relevant	and	so	it	does	not	matter	if	the	question	is	seen	as	
one	of	mitigation	or	of	the	measure	of	damages.	
																																																								
28		See	for	a	helpful	analysis	of	the	position	in	Kyla	Shipping	Co	Ltd	v.	Bunge	SA	[2013]	EWCA	734.	
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5)	The	fact	that	a	mitigating	step,	(either	by	an	action	or	by	inaction)	may	be	a	
sensible	business	decision	with	a	view	to	reducing	the	impact	of	the	breach	does	
not	of	itself	make	it	one	that	is	sufficiently	caused	by	the	breach.	
6)	For	there	to	be	mitigation	there	must	be	a	sufficient	causal	connection	
between	the	breach	and	the	mitigating	step	but	it	is	not	enough	to	just	show	that	
there	is	a	two-step	process,	(i.e.	a	causal	link	between	breach	and	mitigation	and	
between	mitigation	and	benefit)	there	must	also	be	a	direct	link	between	breach	
and	benefit.	
7)	Where	benefit	comes	about	from	a	transaction	that	the	non-	breaching	party	
could	have	made	irrespective	of	the	breach-	this	suggests	that	that	the	breach	is	
not	sufficiently	causative	of	the	benefit.	
8)	While	there	is	no	requirement	for	the	benefit	to	be	of	the	same	kind	as	the	loss	
claimed	or	mitigated	then	this	difference	between	the	two	might	indicate	that	
the	benefit	is	not	caused	by	the	breach.	
9)	Common	sense	should	prevail	when	deciding	if	the	benefit	flows	from	the	
breach.	
10)	A	causal	link	between	breach	and	benefit	is	generally	necessary	but	this	may	
not	be	enough;	there	must	also	be	consideration	of	justice,	fairness	and	public	
policy.	
11)	One	example	of	a	breach	of	fairness	and	justice	would	be	if	the	breaching	
party	were	allowed	to	benefit	from	something	which	the	non-breaching	party	
has	done	for	its	own	benefit	e.g.	an	insurance	policy	or	a	pension	scheme.	In	
support	of	this	Popplewell	J	referred	to	the	case	of	Parry	v.	Cleaver29.	
																																																								
29	Parry	v.	Cleaver	[1969]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep	183,	187	particularly	Lord	Reid’s	judgment.		
“Then	it	is	said	that	instead	of	getting	a	pension	he	may	get	sick	pay	for	a	time	during	his	
disablement	-	perhaps	his	whole	wage.	That	would	not	be	deductible,	so	why	should	a	
pension	be	different?	But	a	man's	wage	for	a	particular	week	is	not	related	to	the	amount	
of	work	which	he	does	during	that	week.	Wages	for	the	period	of	a	man's	holiday	do	not	
differ	in	kind	from	wages	paid	to	him	during	the	rest	of	the	year.	And	neither	does	sick	pay;	
it	is	still	wages.	So	during	the	period	when	he	receives	sick	pay	he	has	lost	nothing.	…	
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Popplewell	J	provides	us	with	a	handy	list	of	principles	for	our	guidance	but	it	
might	be	argued	that	some	overlap	and	that	in	practice	amount	to	the	same	
thing,	particularly	principles	nine,	ten	and	eleven.		
	
3. Analysis	
We	suggest	that	it	would	have	been	helpful	if	the	question	of	the	availability	of	
replacement	employment	for	the	vessel	had	been	more	thoroughly	explored	by	
the	arbitrator,	(the	subsequent	court	hearings	relying	on	that	first	tribunal’s	
assessment	of	fact).	We	know	that	no	two-	year	charter	was	available	but	what	
about	shorter	term	employment?	One	or	perhaps	a	series	of	six-month	contracts	
might	have	provided	an	opportunity	for	mitigation	if	it	had	been	found	to	exist.	
We	know	that	the	vessel	was	sold	so	we	presume	that	those	purchasers	thought	
that	there	were	employment	prospects.	
The	New	Flamenco	in	its	passage	through	the	legal	system	gave	rise	to	
opportunities,	which	the	High	Court	and	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	particular	used	in	
order	to	work	through	the	legal	principles.		The	Supreme	Court	has	given	
judgement	for	the	owner.	So,	have	we	reached	a	definitive	position	on	
mitigation?		As	we	have	noted,	the	arbitrator	and	the	court	were	presented	with	
an	unusual	argument	i.e.	that	the	proceeds	of	a	voluntary	sale	of	the	vessel	
should	be	given	to	the	credit	of	the	party	breaching	a	time	charter.		
Unfortunately,	the	Supreme	Court	judgement	was	brief	and	this	leaves	us	with	
some	anxiety	that	this	is	not	the	end	of	the	matter	and	that	there	will	
undoubtedly	be	more	cases	on	the	nature	and	extent	of	mitigation.	
	
IV. JAPANESE	RULES	EQUIVALENT	TO	MITIGATION	IN	ENGLAND	
1. Rules	of	limiting	damages	
																																																								
A	pension	is	intrinsically	of	a	different	kind	from	wages.	….	wages	are	a	reward	for	
contemporaneous	work	but	that	a	pension	is	the	fruit,	through	insurance,	of	all	the	money	
which	was	set	aside	in	the	past	in	respect	of	his	past	work.	They	are	different	in	kind.”	
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The	above	has	been	a	brief	examination	of	some	current	issues	concerning	
damages	and	more	particularly	mitigation	in	England	and	Wales.	What	then	of	
the	position	in	that	other	sophisticated	commercial	country,	Japan.	The	same	
issues	will	occur.	What	is	likely	to	be	the	approach	and	outcome	under	Japanese	
Law?	
Firstly,	 in	 Japan	 the	 judicial	 approach	 is	 to	 consider	 doctrines	 that	 reduce	 the	
amount	of	damages	
Under	Japanese	law,	the	amount	of	damages	that	should	be	payable	for	breach	of	
contract	or	negligence	may	be	reduced	on	the	ground	of	three	doctrines:		
The	claimant’s	failure	to	comply	with	his/her/its	duty	of	mitigation.	This	is	
referred	to	as	songai-keigen-gimu).	
Secondly.	deduction	of	the	claimant’s	benefit	accrued	from	the	cause	of	breach	or	
negligence	(son-eki-sosai),	or		
Thirdly,	on	the	basis	of	the	claimant’s	comparative	negligence	(kashitsu-sosai).	
It	seems	to	us	that	the	first	two	doctrines	have	a	close	similarity	to	those	English	
law	principles	of	mitigation	but	that	the	third	doctrine	i.e.	that	of	comparative	
negligence	has	a	different	basis.	It	is	more	closely	related	to	the	cause	of	the	
breach	and	shares	similarities	with	the	English	concept	of	contributory	
negligence.	Under	this	doctrine,	any	fault	on	the	side	of	the	claimant	(including	
his	or	her	family	members,	friends,	colleagues,	employees,	etc.),	which	caused	
damages	or	increased	the	amount	of	damages	may	be	an	element	to	be	taken	
into	consideration	by	the	courts	in	reducing	the	amount	of	damages	claimed.	The	
rule	is	similar	to	English	rule	of	contributory	negligence,	although	in	Japan	the	
rule	applies	to	damages	for	breach	of	contract	and	for	negligence	in	the	same	
way.30	The	rule	is	also	applicable	to	reduce	liquidated	damages.31	
	
2.	Duty	of	mitigation	
																																																								
30	Civil	Code,	arts	418	and	722(2).	
31	Judgment	of	Supreme	Court	of	21	April	1994	Saiji	1121-73.	
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The	basis	of	this	duty	is	a	rule	of	law	under	the	principle	of	good	faith.	Generally,	
the	claimant’s	failure	to	comply	with	such	duty	is	taken	into	consideration	in	
determining	the	amount	of	the	“ordinary	damages”	claimed	in	accordance	with	
Article	416,	paragraph	1	of	the	Civil	Code	as	referred	to	in	II.1	above.32		
A	typical	example	of	its	application	is	the	judgement	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	19	
January	2009.33	In	this	case,	the	claimant	was	a	tenant	of	a	commercial	premise	
in	an	old	building	where	it	carried	out	the	business	of	karaoke	store.	In	February	
1997,	due	to	a	failure	of	the	drainage	facility	of	the	building,	the	demised	premise	
was	flooded	and	became	unusable.	The	claimant	requested	the	defendant,	the	
owner	of	the	building,	to	repair	the	demised	premise	so	as	to	recommence	its	
karaoke	store.	However,	the	defendant	refused	and	gave	notice	to	terminate	the	
contract	of	lease.	Under	Japanese	law,	it	was	evident	that	such	notice	was	invalid	
and	the	defendant	breached	its	obligation	as	lessor	to	repair	the	premise.	In	
September	1998	(i.e.,	nineteen	months	after	the	above	incident),	the	claimant	
brought	an	action	against	the	defendant	for	compensation	of	damages	incurred	
by	the	defendant’s	failure	to	repair	the	demised	premise	in	breach	of	the	
contract.	An	issue	in	the	case	was	the	amount	of	damages.	The	lower	court	
granted	the	claimant	recovery	of	the	full	amount	of	damages	claimed,	including	
its	lost	profit	for	the	period	of	four	and	a	half	years	(from	March	1997	to	August	
2001),	during	which	the	claimant	could	not	carry	out	karaoke	business	in	the	
premise.	However,	on	appeal,	the	Supreme	Court	did	not	agree	to	such	amount.	
The	Court	said	that,	before	commencement	of	this	action,	the	claimant	should	
have	known	that	its	karaoke	business	could	not	be	restarted	in	the	same	
premise,	which	was	quite	ruined	at	that	time.	Taking	account	of	it	and	other	
relevant	circumstances,	the	claimant	was	under	the	duty	to	take	some	steps,	
such	as	restarting	the	karaoke	business	in	another	place,	to	mitigate	the	amount	
of	damages.	The	court	held	that	it	was	against	rule	of	law	to	claim	compensation	
of	all	damages	without	taking	any	steps.	The	damage	amount	was	therefore	
limited	to	the	claimant’s	lost	profit	until	the	point	of	time	when	the	claimant	
could	have	restarted	another	karaoke	store	somewhere	else.		
																																																								
32	Another	situation	where	such	duty	is	taken	into	account	is	the	decision	of	the	claimant’s	
contributory	negligence	(Civil	Code	art	418).	
33	Judgment	of	Supreme	Court	of	19	January	2009,	Hanta	1289	-85.	
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This	does	seem	to	be	close	to	calling	this	a	duty,	which	we	have	noted	above	is	
not	the	case	under	English	law	although	for	practical	purposes	there	does	not	
seem	to	be	very	much	difference.	The	above	rule	adopted	by	the	court	seems	to	
be	identical	to	the	first	rule	of	mitigation	under	English	law34,	as	provided	in	
McGregor	on	Damages	referred	to	in	III.1	above.	However,	the	rule	is	different	
from	the	second	and	third	English	rules	set	out	in	the	same	book.		
Under	Japanese	law,	the	courts	apply	the	above	rule	in	order	to	reduce	the	
amount	of	damages	claimed,	taking	account	of	the	amount,	which	should	have	
been	mitigated	had	the	claimant	took	reasonable	steps	by	action	or	inaction.	The	
actual	benefit	received	by	the	claimant	may	not	be	reduced	by	operation	of	this	
rule.		
	
3.	Deduction	of	benefit	accrued	
Benefit	may	be	deducted	from	the	damages	claimed	by	application	of	this	rule.	
Under	the	doctrine	of	benefit	accrued,	if	the	claimant	receives	benefit	as	a	result	
of	the	same	cause	as	the	cause	of	damages	at	the	time	they/it	suffers	damages,	
the	amount	of	such	benefit	shall	be	deducted	from	the	amount	of	damages	
claimed,	provided	that,	the	damage	claimed	and	the	benefit	shall	have	the	same	
nature	and	shall	be	exchangeable.35	This	rule	is	recognized	by	the	court	under	
the	principle	of	fairness	and	used	in	determining	the	amount	of	damages	for	both	
breach	of	contract	and	negligence.		
Benefits	deductible	under	this	rule	may	be	accrued	from	the	claimant’s	action.	
For	example,	in	the	case	where	a	contract	of	property	lease	is	terminated	by	the	
lessor	on	the	ground	of	the	lessee’s	anticipatory	breach	in	the	middle	of	the	term,	
in	principle	the	lessor	is	entitled	to	claim	damages	in	the	amount	representing	
their/its	net	loss	of	income	for	the	remaining	period	of	the	lease.	However,	if,	
																																																								
34	One	notable	difference	is	that	the	Japanese	rule	may	be	operated	to	reduce	the	amount	of	
liquidated	damages	(Judgment	of	Supreme	Court	of	21	April	1994	(n	31)	–	Although	the	case	
relates	to	application	of	the	comparative	negligence	to	liquidated	damages,	under	Japanese	law,	
breach	of	duty	of	mitigation	is	of	the	same	nature	as	negligence,	i.e.	breach	of	duty	of	care.).	
35	Judgment	of	Supreme	Court	of	24	March	1993,	Minshu	47-4-3039	(The	case	relates	to	damages	
caused	by	negligence,	however,	under	the	Japanese	law,	the	same	rule	applies	to	damages	for	
breach	of	contract.).	
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during	such	period,	the	lessor	leased	the	same	property	to	another	person,	
benefits	received	from	the	new	lessee	shall	be	deducted	from	the	amount	of	
damages	claimed.	The	example	is	illustrated	in	a	case	of	Yokohama	District	Court	
concerning	a	property	lease	contract	between	two	neighbouring	cities	in	
Kanagawa	prefecture	(Yokohama-City	and	Hiratsuka-City).36	In	this	case,	
Yokohama-City	took	a	bicycle	racetrack	and	related	facilities	on	lease	from	
Hiratsuka-City	and	carried	out	the	bicycle	racing	business	for	over	50	years.	In	
2000,	Yokohama-City	decided	to	withdraw	from	this	business	which	was	
unprofitable	and	notified	Hiratsuka-City	to	terminate	the	lease.	Hiratsuka-City	
claimed	against	Yokohama-City	for	damages	of	lost	profit	amounting	to	the	
expected	rent	income	in	the	next	three	years.	The	court	admitted	Hiratsuka-
City’s	claim,	however,	the	court	noticed	that	Hiratsuka-City	operated	bicycle	
racing	at	the	same	racetrack	during	such	three-year	period.	Based	on	such	fact,	
the	amount	of	net	profit	received	through	its	own	operation	of	racings	was	held	
to	be	deducted.	
Deduction	of	benefit	is	allowed	under	the	rule	also	in	the	case	where	benefit	is	
accrued	by	a	cause	unrelated	to	the	claimant’s	action	or	inaction	so	long	as	such	
benefit	has	the	same	nature	as,	and	exchangeable	for,	the	damages.		
In	the	case	of	Supreme	Court,	where	the	claimant	awarded	damages	as	a	result	of	
death	of	her	husband	due	to	medical	negligence	of	the	defendant	(doctor),	it	was	
held	that	the	amount	of	survivor’s	pension	payable	to	the	claimant	shall	be	
deducted	from	the	amount	of	her	damages.37	The	survivor’s	pension	was	granted	
to	the	claimant	without	her	action	to	mitigate	damages,	but	it	was	granted	to	her	
in	place	of	her	deceased	husband’s	retirement	pension	that	he	had	been	entitle.	
Based	on	this,	the	Supreme	Court	decided	that	the	survivor’s	pension	had	the	
same	nature	as	the	claimant’s	damages	because	it	was	a	replacement	of	the	
retirement	pension,	which	should	be	considered	as	part	of	the	lost	profit.		
On	first	examination,	this	ruling	seems	out	of	line	with	the	English	decision	of	
Parry	v.	Cleaver	(at	n	29)	above	where	Lord	Reid	says:	
																																																								
36	Judgment	of	Yokohama	District	Court	of	14	May	2010,	Hanji	2083-105.		
37	n	35.	
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“A	pension	is	intrinsically	of	a	different	kind	from	wages.	….	wages	are	a	reward	
for	contemporaneous	work	but	that	a	pension	is	the	fruit,	through	insurance,	of	
all	the	money	which	was	set	aside	in	the	past	in	respect	of	his	past	work.	They	
are	different	in	kind.”	But	as	we	will	see	the	Japanese	court	has	also	considered	
this	point	and	decided	that	the	amount	of	life	insurance	proceeds	shall	not	be	
deductible	under	this	rule.	The	Supreme	Court	so	held	in	the	case	where	the	
claimants	claimed	damages	for	the	defendant’s	negligent	accident	that	caused	
loss	of	their	son’s	life.38	The	Court	said	that	life	insurance	proceeds	which	were	
paid	were	of	the	nature	of	consideration	for	the	premium	that	the	deceased	son	
had	paid,	and	it	was	to	be	paid	on	his	death	in	any	event	and	without	regard	to	
the	defendant’s	negligence.		
In	another	case	where	a	drug	chain	brought	an	action	against	the	Tokyo	Electric	
Power	Company	on	the	basis	that	the	accident	of	the	Fukushima	Power	Station	
following	the	Great	Earthquake	(“the	Accident”)	was	caused	by	its	negligence,	
the	claimant	claimed	damages	in	the	sum	of	its	lost	profit	as	a	result	of	closure	of	
five	stores	within	the	region	of	the	Accident.39	However,	evidence	proved	that	
profits	of	the	claimant’s	other	stores	in	Fukushima	prefecture	increased	rapidly	
after	the	Accident.	The	court	found	that	such	increase	of	profit	was	caused	by	the	
Accident	because	people	in	the	region	of	the	Accident	moved	to	other	areas	in	
Fukushima.	Taking	it	into	account,	the	court	deducted	the	amount	equivalent	to	
37.5%	of	the	claimant’s	increased	profit	in	the	other	area	of	Fukushima	from	the	
amount	of	the	lost	profit	claimed.		
	
4.	Analysis	
In	view	of	these	cases,	there	are	some	similarities	between	the	above	rule	of	
benefit	accrued	and	English	rule	of	mitigation.	As	with	part	of	the	principles	
listed	by	Popplewell	J	in	the	New	Flamenco	case,40	under	the	Japanese	rule	(i)	the	
cause	of	benefit	claimed	must	be	the	same	as	the	cause	of	damages,	i.e.,	the	
breach	or	negligence,	(ii)	if	benefit	accrued	from	a	transaction	that	the	non-	
																																																								
38	Judgment	of	Supreme	Court	of	25	September	1964,	Hanji	385-51.	
39	Judgment	of	Sapporo	District	Court	of	18	March	2014,	Hanji	2320-103.	
40	n	27.	Where	eleven	principles	were	set	out.	
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breaching	party	could	have	made	irrespective	of	the	breach,	the	breach	is	not	
sufficiently	causative	of	the	benefit,41	and	(iii)	there	must	also	be	consideration	
of	justice,	fairness	and	public	policy.42		
However,	the	Japanese	rule	is	different	from	English	principles	in	several	points.	
First,	under	Japanese	rule	the	benefit	must	be	of	the	same	nature	as,	and	must	be	
exchangeable	for,	the	loss	claimed,43	while	under	English	law	difference	in	the	
nature	is	merely	a	factor	to	negate	a	causal	link	between	the	loss	and	the	benefit.	
Second,	in	the	case	where	befit	comes	from	the	claimant’s	action	for	mitigation,	
English	rule	requires	a	direct	link	between	the	breach	and	the	benefit,	however,	
in	Japan	it	does	not	seem	to	be	essential	so	long	as	the	benefit	and	the	loss	has	
the	same	nature.44		Above	all,	under	the	Japanese	rule	of	benefit	accrued,	benefit	
does	not	have	to	be	accrued	from	any	steps	of	mitigation	(by	action	or	inaction)	
taken	by	the	claimant.45		
Nonetheless,	in	a	case	like	that	of	the	New	Flamenco,	we	are	of	the	view	that	the	
Japanese	courts	would	reach	the	same	conclusion	as	the	decision	of	the	English	
Court	if	the	same	action	under	the	same	facts	were	brought	in	Japan.	This	is	
because	the	cause	of	the	owners’	benefit	(or	avoidance	of	loss)	in	that	case	was	
merely	an	incidental	change	of	the	economic	and	market	condition.	Such	cause	
was	unrelated	to	the	charterers’	breach,	which	caused	the	owners’	loss	of	profit.	
Moreover,	the	nature	of	the	benefit	(i.e.	the	gain	from	the	timing	of	sale	owing	to	
the	change	in	market	price)	is	different	in	nature	from	damages	claimed	(the	loss	
of	rent	income).		
	
V. CONCLUSION	
It	seems	that	both	legal	regimes,	Japan	and	England	and	Wales	have	a	rich	
history	of	commercial	cases	in	which	the	level	of	damages	to	be	awarded	was	in	
disputes	and	that	both	systems	allow	sufficient	flexibility	to	the	courts	for	the	
																																																								
41	n	38.	
42	n	35.	
43	n	35,	n	36	and	n	38.	
44	n	35.	
45	n	35	and	n	39.	
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development	of	rules	to	provide	sophisticated	and	nuanced	decisions.	It	is	true	
that	in	Japan	there	are	codes	which	proscribe	the	ability	of	the	courts	to	deviate	
and	depart	too	much	from	the	statutory	provision	but	nonetheless	both	systems	
of	law	have	arrived	at	very	similar	conclusions.	Given	the	lack	of	firm	statement	
in	the	English	Supreme	Court’s	decision	in	the	New	Flamenco	there	is	a	
possibility	for	deviation	between	Japan	and	England	and	Wales	and	we	wonder	if	
in	ten	years’	time	the	two	systems	will	maintain	this	close	proximity	of	outcome.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
